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Abstract
Do entrepreneurial ventures that adopt open business model (i.e., ?Open source?) obtain a different quality of VC
financing, and receive a different level of VC governance and monitoring post investment? We conduct the analysis on a
sample of 514 software entrepreneurial ventures that received VC funding in 6,555 different deals extracted from
VentureXpert. The data indicate entrepreneurial ventures with open business model receive funding from VCs that are
more highly industry-specialized; more experienced, had greater IPO success, raised more capital and are more
connected in syndication network. Also, they are monitored more intensively through more frequent staged investment
rounds. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
High-tech entrepreneurial ventures are characterized by pronounced levels of information 
asymmetry and uncertainty (Hall, 2002; Hall & Lerner, 2010).  Accordingly, their access to traditional 
sources of financing is limited (Berger & Udell, 1998), hence venture capitals (VC) are considered of 
crucial importance (Gompers & Lerner, 1999). VCs are active investors, which screen entrepreneurial 
ventures thoroughly and are involved in monitoring and management of entrepreneurial ventures after 
investment (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989). 
 The probability of success based on observable characteristics is a key factor in the VC evaluation of 
entrepreneurial ventures (Stuart et al, 1999). One of these characteristics is the business model that 
entrepreneurial ventures adopt to commercialize the technology (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2004). 
Business model refers to the ways ventures capture and create value from an underlying technology 
(Teece, 2010). Traditionally technological ventures create value through closed business model 
(CBM) in which innovation is protected by mean of Intellectual property rights (IPRs) in order to 
achieve monopoly rents (Barney, 1991). In this model VCs helps entrepreneurial ventures to protect 
and scale up their projects in order to achieve the super normal profits.  However, recently ventures 
opened up their innovation processes which allow them to access external knowledge sources along 
with internal ones (Chesbrough, 2003). The new innovation process requires mechanisms that venture 
should employ to access external knowledge and create value. Chesbrough (2006) refers to these 
mechanisms as “open business model” (OBM). The OBM differs from the traditional model of value 
creation, which creates value through isolating mechanism and monopoly rent, in two distinctive 
features. First, in OBM innovation is a joint effort of external and internal knowledge sources. Second, 
revealing technology and knowledge is an essential means of collaboration between external and 
internal knowledge sources (Alexy and George, 2013). The OBM allows ventures by reaching outside 
boundaries of organization captures and create value through increasing innovative performance 
(Larsen and Salter, 2006), cutting cost (Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003) and improving the quality of 
products (Chesbrough, 2003). On the other hand revealing technology and knowledge limit ability of 
ventures to capture value through traditional appropriability mechanisms (i.e. IP Rights) to the fullest 
extent. Hence the main concern is the complexity of business model and finding a way to generate a 
sustainable return from investment in technologies which are freely available (partly or fully) to other 
players.  
The prominent examples of ventures using OBM are open source software (OSS) entrepreneurial 
ventures (Alexy and George, 2013; Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007). The novel aspect of OSS 
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business model is reliance on communities of users in order to support their innovation processes 
(Bonaccorsi et al., 2006; Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005, 2008; Stam, 2009). OSS business model is 
associated with complexity and risk due to weak intellectual property protection and a complicated 
institutional setting (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Mann, 2006; West and Gallagher, 2006). There are 
growing numbers of OSS entrepreneurial ventures which are looking for external financing1. 
Anecdotal evidence shows OSS entrepreneurial ventures have been able to attract VCs’ attention and 
capital by acquiring more than $3.6 billion in the period of 1997-2010 (Aslett, 2010). Some VCs 
consider OSS as a “new ecosystem”2. There are VCs who monitor OSS entrepreneurial ventures 
extensively and look for business opportunities (e.g. North Bridge)3 or focus entirely on OSS 
entrepreneurial ventures (i.e. Bastos Venture4). Ability to raise VC financing by  OSS entrepreneurial 
ventures constitute an empirical puzzle because it defies importance of strong intellectual property 
protection in VC financing of high-tech entrepreneurial ventures5. In this paper, we study OSS 
business model in comparison with proprietary entrepreneurial ventures (CBM), which develop 
proprietary software within the boundaries of the firm and the source codes are not revealed. 
Prior research which has explored OBM, by using qualitative and anecdotal evidences speculated 
benefits of OBM (e.g. Chesbrough, 2006).  However, scholars have rarely explored the financing of 
ventures adopting OBM (see Alexy & George, 2011, for an exception). In this paper, we investigate 
entrepreneurial ventures which adopted OBM, by asking two general research questions: Does 
adoption of OBM by entrepreneurial ventures affect the quality of VC financing an entrepreneurial 
venture obtains? Is governance of the investors different than that of entrepreneurial ventures with 
closed business model?  
We draw our theoretical argument on the risk and complexity associated with entrepreneurial ventures 
with OSS business model. We argue how challenges in OSS business model system of activity and 
revenue model cause complexity and risk. These challenges are the consequence of OSS business 
model peculiar characteristics of community based technology development and lack of reliance on 
intellectual property (Aslett, β009, Perr et al, β010, O’Mahony and Ferraro, β007; Dahlander and 
Magnusson, 2008, Lerner and Tirole, 2005). Since OSS entrepreneurial ventures are facing with 
higher risk and complexity, therefore, marginal effect of quality of VC is larger. On the other hand,  
high risk and complexity and potential for high return makes high quality VCs more inclined to invest 
                                                          
1
 “Sevin Rosen Funds general partner Nick Sturiale mentions his firm received no fewer than 30 business plans from new open source 
companies in 2005”. http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Venture-Capital-Open-source-startups-are-hot-1183525.php#ixzz29xIfFZlp 
2
 http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-10-02/open-source-now-its-an-ecosystem 
3
 http://www.northbridge.com/open-source 
4
 http://bastosventures.com/ 
5
 Qualitative and quantitative studies highlighted the importance of proprietary technology in VC financing (MacMillan et al. 1985, 1987; 
Mann, 2005, Engel and Keilbach, 2007; Mann and Sager, 2007; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2012). 
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in OSS ventures since they have a higher risk tolerance and better resources and expertise to deal with 
complexity.   
We draw our analysis based on a sample of 514 North American VC-backed software 
entrepreneurial ventures extracted from SDC Platinum (VentureXpert), which received the first round 
of VC investment in the period of 1994-2008. In order to identify OSS entrepreneurial ventures, we 
have relied on different sources of data (described in detail in the data section). The final sample 
includes 6,555 dyadic portfolio company (PC)-to-VC, which 2,029  of them belong to OSS 
entrepreneurial ventures (from 124 OSS entrepreneurial ventures).The data indicate VCs that invest in 
OSS entrepreneurial ventures have significantly higher quality than VCs invest in proprietary ones. 
We measure VC quality by industry specific specialization, general experience, IPO experience, 
capital under management and betweenness centrality6 in syndication network. Furthermore, we 
observe OSS entrepreneurial ventures receive VC financing in more rounds. On the other hand, there 
are no significant differences in syndication size. One might argue the result can be biased due to 
unobserved heterogeneity (for example OSS entrepreneurial ventures are high quality ventures which 
are able to attract high quality VCs). In order to address this problem we take a number of steps. First, 
in robustness check we control for the exit as a quality proxy. In addition, we control for endogeneity 
using Heckman treatment model, instrumental variables and switching regressions. Finally we employ 
propensity score matching in order to control possible biases in the sample. The results are 
qualitatively similar. 
This study also contributes to the strand of literature that investigates the relationship between 
entrepreneurial venture’s characteristics and VC investment. Prior literatures studied role of patents 
(Mann & Sager, 2008; Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008), product market strategy (Hellmann and Puri, 2000), 
employee growth (Davila et al., 2003), entrepreneur experience and education (Hsu, 2007) and 
litigation (Cumming et al., 2011). While prior research highlighted importance of business model in 
VC financing (e.g. Kaplan and Stromberg, 2004), but empirical studies treat entrepreneurial ventures 
homogenous regarding their business models.  We contribute to this studies by focusing on different 
business models (open VS. closed) of entrepreneurial ventures and its impact on VC financing.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews briefly literature and develops 
hypothesis. Section 3 describes the sample and the data collection procedure; define the variables and 
the methodology used in the analysis.  Section 4 presents the results of empirical analysis and section 
5 discusses the conclusions. 
                                                          
6
 Betweeness centrality represents VCs on whom many others must rely to make connections within the network. Higher betweeness 
represent ability of VC to bring together VCs with complementary abilities or access to deal flows. More detailed explanation can be found 
in Hochberg et al, (2007). 
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2. Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1. Open Source Software 
Traditionally firms create value through closed business model in which innovation is protected by 
mean of IPRs in order to achieve monopoly rents (Barney, 1991). Recently a trend is noticed toward 
opening up innovation process and loosening IPRs in order to improve the innovation process by 
acquiring knowledge outside firm boundaries (Chesbrough, 2003). There are several sources of 
external knowledge. A branch of literature on open and distributed innovation has focused on 
communities of users as a major source of innovation with a focus on open source software 
development (e.g von Hippel and von Kroug, 2003). In this section, we will provide a brief 
background of the phenomena and its importance for research.   
Proprietary software, which is developed within the boundaries of the firm and the source codes are 
not revealed, dominated the software development model since 1980s. Recently, OSS phenomenon, 
that several developers scattered around the globe contribute voluntarily in order to develop software 
that their codes are available to everybody, attracted attention of scholars and practitioners. The great 
success of some OSS products such as Linux, Firefox and Apache web server has made OSS as a 
market trend in the software industry (von Hippel & von Krogh, β00γ; O’Mahony, β00γ). 
Sourceforge.net, a single platform for OS projects, has more than 324,000 projects and 3.4 million 
contributors. The first commercialized open source software was introduced in 1995 (Fosfuri et al, 
2008). Ever since not only many entrepreneurial ventures entered the market in order to generate 
monetary profits from new business models7 (Gruber & Henkel, 2006), but also large firms released 
several source codes to the communities (Bonacorssi et al., 2006). A recent survey of 740 executives 
in the software industry forecasts in 2016 more than 50% of software purchased will be OSS8.  
Firms engaged in community collaboration have two distinctive features: “the use of collaborative 
development structures that extend beyond the boundaries of a single firm and the lack of reliance on 
intellectual property (“IP”) rights as a means of appropriating the value of the underlying 
technologies” (Mann, 2006). The former helps firms to access knowledge which otherwise they were 
not able to acquire. Consequently they can generate high quality technology and products (Lerner and 
Tirole, 2002, 2005). Additionally collaboration with community of users reduces the cost of 
innovation since firms are able to utilize resources outside firm’s boundaries with significantly lower 
marginal cost (Chesbrough, 2003, 2006; von Hipple, 1988, 2005; Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003). In 
other words, by using external sources of knowledge a firm can monetize an innovation without 
                                                          
7
 Red Hat Inc., a global leader in providing open source solutions to commercial customers, reported revenue of $297 million for the fourth 
quarter of 2011, 21% increase from last year quarter (http://www.verticalnews.com/premium_newsletters/Investment-Weekly-News/2012-04-
14/3574IV.html). 
8
 http://northbridge.com/2012-open-source-survey 
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incurring the complete cost of development (West, 2006). Also, active participation in community 
collaboration gives firms visibility and assist to build a technical reputation (West, 2007).  Aslett 
(2009) provide evidences that practitioner notice benefits of OSS business model as lower 
development and distribution cost, reduced sales cycle and better-quality software. 
Due to mentioned characteristics of OSS business model, it appears that well-known issues of market 
entry barriers, smallness and newness are less relevant for OSS entrepreneurial ventures (Henkel and 
Gruber, 2006). These characteristics raise other challenges and complexities which should be 
addressed for achieving success9. In the following section drawing on prior literature we highlight 
challenges and complexity of open source business models.   
2.2. Open Source Business Model 
The recent surge on importance of business model in economic and management literature lead to 
several studies trying to provide a definition of business model (for a summary of literature see Zott et 
al, 2011).  In this paper we resort on these studies and define business model as “the way firm operates 
to create and capture value” (Teece, 2010) and focus on two dimensions of OSS business model: 
system of activities (Amit & Zott, 2001) and revenue generation model (Teece, 2010) which 
differentiate it from traditional proprietary models. 
An important feature of OSS business model is collaboration with community of developers with no 
contractual ties to the focal firm. This peculiar characteristic engenders additional complexity to the 
system of activities of entrepreneurial ventures.  The OSS entrepreneurial ventures need to use other 
forms of coordination (rather than formal means of control and bureaucratic governance) in order to 
align community with the strategic objectives of the firm and to avoid discontinuity in the project10 
(O’Mahony and Ferraro, β007; Dahlander and Magnusson, β008).  
 A broad range of community collaboration models exist. Entrepreneurial ventures can choose to play 
an active role in community and contribute to development of open source projects directly11, for 
example by allowing the employees to spend (fully or partially) time on development of open source 
projects or by hiring the most prolific developers in the community (Sponsored developers) 
(Dahlander and Wallin, 2006). Sponsored developers provide visibility and access to the development 
                                                          
9
 Aslett (2009) based on a survey of 61 representatives from investment firms summaries the top risk of OSS entrepreneurial ventures as 
following: the difficulty in converting downloads to paying customers (57.4%), difficulty in generating revenue (47.5%), lack of intellectual 
property controls (44.3%), lack of barriers to direct competition (41.0%), lack of control over the future direction of development (32.8%). 
10
 Joomla, a content management system (CMS), which is a powerful online application in building web site, is a project that started on 
August 17, 2005 by developers which were not happy with community management of Mambo project. The forked project (Joomla) leads to 
stop in the Mambo project in 2008 (http://royal.pingdom.com/2008/09/11/10-interesting-open-source-software-forks-and-why-they-
happened/). 
11
 This is possible by initiating a new community or contributing to existing ones (Dahlander, 2007). 
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process and informally influence the project (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008).The managerial challenge 
in this model is to be able to respect norms and values of community, obey license and getting 
acceptance of community (Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005). This is possible by use of democratic 
and pluralistic mechanism in the governance of communities (O’Mahony and Ferraro, β007; 
O’Mahoney and Bechky, β008).  Entrepreneurial ventures such as SugarCRM, SleepyCat and JBoss 
can be categorized in this section (Perr, et al, 2010). Alternatively ventures can use available codes 
developed by community without any significant contribution to the core OSS project. Dahlander and 
Magnusson (2005) refer to this approach as parasitic, which can lead to negative image in community 
and even create conflict with community which perceives the venture as a free rider. This can 
endanger a sustainable business model. O’Mahoney and Bechky (β008) identified major challenges 
which can lead to divergence between ventures and the community.  The main challenges are while 
entrepreneurial venture would like to align community with their strategy and timetable and improve 
predictability in the software development, the community prefers to maintain communal form, 
working norms and individual technical autonomy.  This issue can be crucial for entrepreneurial 
ventures which require raising money and this is possible only by committing to provide a road map or 
milestones (O’Mahoney and Bechky, 2008).   
As regard to the revenue generation models, a wide array of real world OSS business models exist 
(Perr et al, 2010; Alexy and George, 2013; Aslett, 2009). In this paper we focus on two main 
categories of “selling complementary products and service” and “dual licensing”. 
In the former company collaborate in the development of OSS in order to increase the demand for 
their complementary products /services12. The major example of this one is Red Hat which monetize 
on providing supports and updates for Linux. The wide diffusion of Linux will increase the demands 
for Red Hat services. This can be done also by sales of hardware which use OSS. In this case profit is 
generated through sales of hardware while use of OSS can assist to reduce development cost. The 
interesting examples of this case are entrepreneurial venture which use the Linux operating system that 
are tailored for devices such as mobile phones and machine controls (Gruber and Henkel, 2006). 
 The main challenge here is to manage the complementarities between OSS and product/service. This 
implies that entrepreneurial venture require to manage this relationship in order to sustain 
complementarity of OSS with their product/services in order to be able generate return from OSS 
technologies which are characterized as weak appropriability regime (Teece, 1986). This is 
problematic since venture does not have control over OSS community. The change in direction of 
development in OSS community can fade away the complementrarity of product/services which 
venture provides. Moreover ventures should provide complementary product/services (high quality) 
                                                          
12
 Complementary Product/Services can be a wide range of offering such as Professional services/consulting, support or devices (Perr et al., 
2010). 
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which are not fully competitive. Since in the fully competitive market they cannot extract super 
normal rent from their product/services. This is also relevant for community since it provides 
incentives for the venture to sponsor the community (Katz and Shapiro, 1994). Hence they need to 
protect their complementary product/service. In case of hardware the situation is similar to proprietary 
ventures since they can use IPRs. While if the venture provides services, it cannot be protected by 
means of IPR. In the latter the venture must use strategic means for protecting its competitive 
advantage (Cohen et al, 2000). Methods such as network effects, lead times, first-mover advantages 
along with access to complementary assets, are more valuable for this OSS entrepreneurial ventures 
(Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005, Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003).  
The dual licensing model refers to differentiating the licenses of product for different customers (Perr 
et al, 2010; Alexy and George, 2013). It is very similar to versioning where a free version is available 
to individuals and a premium version is available for companies (Shapiro and Varian, 1998a). The 
examples of entrepreneurial ventures that adopted this model are MySQL and Sleepycat (Goldman 
and Gabriel, 2005; Perr et al, 2010). Customers are able usually to self select by freely downloading 
OSS. The challenge is transferring self selected customers through free downloads to paying 
customers (Perr et al, 2010, Aslett, 2009). The second challenge is to manage network externalities 
between the free version and premium version of the software (Shapiro and Varian, 1998b). This 
implies that value of premium version to the customers increase by number of people using free 
version (Gandal, 1995). Since wider user networks of free versions provide testing and feedback 
which consequently improve quality of product and also facilitate exchange of file and know-how with 
larger crowd (Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003). In addition wider diffusion of free version as a core can 
create indirect externalities (Farell and Saloner, 1985). This implies improving compatibility of 
premium version with other applications which are developed based on the OSS core. The 
compatibility increases the value of premium version to adopters (Katz and Shapiro, 1994) and 
increase probability of self-selection in premium version (Gandal, 1995).  Hence in this model 
network externality implies that not only ventures need to match low quality/low price (differentiation 
with premium version) for free version but have to encourage people to use the free version in order to 
increase value of premium version. Since entrepreneurial venture has limited control over community, 
the change in direction of community can endanger venture sustainability in two ways. First 
community can improve quality of the free version significantly that premium version has no 
additional value to the paying customers. This is important since differentiating between free version 
and premium version is a key factor for creating demand for premium version (Shapiro and Varian, 
1998a).  On the contrary community can reduce the quality of free version so that it diminishes the 
network externalities. This can lead to reduction in demand for premium version and increase in the 
development cost.  
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In summary, even though OSS entrepreneurial ventures are able to generate high values by producing 
high quality products with lower cost, but they are associated with complexity in generating revenue 
from these products. On the other word, while OSS business model in comparison with proprietary has 
better value creation due to access to a large community of developers, it has inferior value capture 
since technology is freely available (partly of fully) (Casadesus-Masanell and Llanes, 2011). Alexy 
and George (2013) by using a legitimacy lens show involvement in OSS business models (measured 
as the announcement of OSS) which diverge from existing categories, lead to negative reaction of 
investors due to higher uncertainty.  
2.3. Research Hypothesis: 
The growth of OSS as a new ecosystem attracts attention of industry analysts and VCs which are 
focusing on OSS entrepreneurial venture and looking for business opportunities (e.g. North Bridge, 
Bastos Venture, and The 451 Group).The distinct characteristics of OSS entrepreneurial ventures, 
which are associated with high risk and complexity from one side and potential high return from the 
other side, make them attractive for VCs (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). In the section drawing on 
finance and management literature, we argue why we expect different quality and governance in VC 
investment in OSS entrepreneurial ventures and proprietary ones. 
2.3.1. VC quality13 
Prior research shows VCs not only provide capital to entrepreneurial ventures but also create 
value for entrepreneurial ventures through active monitoring and coaching (Ueda, 2004; Sapienza et 
al, 1996, Sapienza, 1992; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989 and MacMillan et 
al, 1988). VCs are not homogenous in their monitoring and coaching ability and with respect to the 
value which they add to an entrepreneurial venture (Sahlman, 1990, Hsu, 2006). Higher quality VCs 
can add value to entrepreneurial firms through three mechanisms. First, VCs add value by better 
monitoring and coaching. Second, through access to a larger network of suppliers, potential customers 
and executives (Hellman and Puri, 2002; Hochberg et al, 2007). Finally, since there is substantial 
information asymmetries about entrepreneurial venture, the quality and reputation of VC can be used 
as a signal of quality to the outside market and investors (Megginson and Weise, 1991).  Therefore in 
the search for potential investors, entrepreneurial ventures will look for high quality investors 
(Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Hsu, 2004; Sorenson, 2007). Hsu (2004) provides evidence that 
entrepreneurs are willing to give up higher value offers in order to work with higher quality VCs. By 
                                                          
13
 In this paper we refer to VC quality to all dimensions which can distinguish a VC from its peers regarding value added such as experience 
(general and industry), capital under management, success and network centrality. 
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looking at a hand-collected sample of entrepreneurial ventures, which received more than one 
financing offer, he shows offers by high quality VCs are 3 times more likely to be accepted while high 
quality VCs can acquire equity in entrepreneurial ventures with 10-14% discount.   
It has been shown values added by VCs are more valuable for entrepreneurial ventures which are at 
the early stage14 (Sapienza and Timmons, 1989; Timmons and Bygrave, 1986) and involve greater in 
innovation (Sapienza, 1992; Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Tian and Wang, 2011). These finding verifies 
access to high quality VCs are particularly valuable for entrepreneurial ventures which are associated 
with higher risk and complexity. Therefore, we can expect since the managing the complexity and risk 
associated with OSS business model require new organizational routines and managerial capabilities 
(Bonaccorssi et al, 2006); the marginal effect of VCs quality and value added they provide is larger. 
For example, complementary assets and speed to market play vital roles in the success of OSS 
entrepreneurial ventures, therefore, the networks, strategic input and managerial expertise of VCs 
matter more for them. On the other hand since these is a new and complex business model and suffer 
from lack of legitimacy as a reliable business model (Alexy and George, 2013) the marginal effect of 
VC’s quality signaling is more significant in comparison with entrepreneurial ventures that develop a 
proprietary technology. Hence if we consider two entrepreneurial ventures with the same initial value 
of q, the marginal effect of VC quality is larger for the one with OSS business model (ȕ) in 
comparison for proprietary one (Į). It implies the post-money value of entrepreneurial venture 
(Sorenson, 2007) with OSS business model conditional on receiving high quality VC (ȕq) is larger 
than value of proprietary entrepreneurial ventures (Įq). Therefore OSS entrepreneurial venture are 
able to offer larger share of their venture to VC in the hope of future value and attract high quality 
VCs. Additionally, since the OSS business model require managerial abilities which low quality VCs 
lack, they are not able to add value to OSS entrepreneurial ventures. Therefore they will self select 
into less complex entrepreneurial ventures (in this case proprietary). 
Another dimension is related risk associated with OSS business model. VCs evaluate risk and return 
associated with an investment opportunity and decides whether to invest or not. In the context of VC 
investment under severe uncertainty can be claimed that VC’s resource endowment and expertise can 
adjust risk tolerance of VC firms positively (Tian and Wang, 2011). On the other word the preferred 
level of risk, change by VCs’ quality.  Therefore, high quality VCs are more likely to invest in 
entrepreneurial ventures which are associated with higher risk and complexity (Ruhnka and Young, 
1991). There are two main reasons for the aforementioned argument.  First, VC’s quality will allow 
them to raise further fund despite possible disastrous performance of high risk portfolio firms 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Additionally, it has been shown that expertise and experience can assist 
                                                          
14
 Prior literature based on surveys verifies that risk of loss is significantly larger for early stage firms by ranging between 70%- 53% 
(Ruhnka and Young, 1986; Wetzel, 1981). 
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VCs in controlling risk (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992) in addition to gaining access to networks and 
information (Bygrave, 1988). This implies regarding risk, high quality VCs have similar 
characteristics of risk neutral investors where expected utility of the investment is equal to the 
expected value of the investment (Varian, 1992) while low quality VCs are risk averse. Since the OSS 
entrepreneurial ventures are riskier in comparison with their proprietary counterparts we would expect 
high quality VCs are more likely to invest in them. Quality can also increase the likelihood of the 
success15, the return on investment and reduce the risk of failure (increase the expected value of 
investment).   
Saying that we can conclude, because OSS entrepreneurial ventures are facing a high risk and 
complexity and are more demanding in case of managerial skills, it is more likely that they receive 
investment from VCs with higher Quality. Overall, the aforementioned arguments suggest the first 
hypothesis: 
H1: Entrepreneurial ventures with OSS business model are more likely to receive 
financing from higher quality VC investors. 
2.3.2. VC governance 
VCs in order to deal with the intrinsic risk associated with entrepreneurial ventures and 
minimizes downward risk of investment, use governance practices such as syndication and staging 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Sahlman, 1990; Trester, 1998).  
Staging: A well-known feature of VC investment is staged financing and preserving the option 
to abandon the project rather than upfront investment of all required capital (Sahlman, 1990). Staging 
more frequently allows VCs to monitor entrepreneur efforts and actions, reduce agency cost (Gomper, 
1995) and downward risk by avoiding inefficient continuation through the exit option (Wang and 
Zhou, 2004; Li, 2008). Value of this option is highly correlated with risk of investment (Li, 2008). 
Gompers (1995) in the light of agency theory showed a decrease in industry ratios of tangible assets to 
total assets, higher market-to-book ratios and greater R&D intensities is associated with more frequent 
monitoring through staging. The prior literature verified impact of staging on efficiency of investment 
decisions and improvement of outcome (Tian, 2011; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003, 2004).  Bergemann 
and Hege (1998) discussed the impact of staged financing on reducing information asymmetries and 
learning true potential of ventures. This implies that in each round VC can learn more about the 
entrepreneur and his/her venture, therefore can make better investment decision to continue funding or 
abandon the project. 
                                                          
15
 “value-added often provides the margin of success over failure” (Chapter 9,Bygrave and Timmos,1992) 
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 The risk and complexity associated with OSS entrepreneurial ventures can lead to greater 
uncertainty about returns of investment. Therefore, high risk associated with investment increase value 
of the option to abandon the project and consequently the likelihood of staging. 
H2a: VCs that finance entrepreneurial ventures with OSS business model are more likely to 
provide intensive monitoring and governance through more frequent staging. 
Syndication: Another prominent feature of VC investment is syndication where two or more 
VCs enter to a deal. In the period of 1980-2005, about 70% of VC investments in entrepreneurial 
ventures were syndicated (Tian, 2012). Syndication is a common practice in any investment and is not 
limited to VC financing. For example, any joint venture can be considered as syndication. Sah and 
Stiglitz (1986) provided a model which reveals two separate evaluations are preferable in the decision 
process. Sah and Stiglitz (1986) have not considered venture capital finance, but their model can 
explain syndication of VCs to some extent (Brander et al, 2002).  Scholars have provided two main 
motives for syndication in VC investment: risk sharing through portfolio diversification and resource 
and information sharing by accessing information and resources which they might not have 
themselves (Bygrave, 1987; Gompers and Lerner, 1999).  Lerner (1994) showed experienced VCs 
syndicate first round of investment with experienced peers. In the first round of investment 
information asymmetry and uncertainty about the return is high, therefore syndication will help to 
reduce the risk and access resources for better screening and coaching. Brander et al (2002) by 
studying Canadian VC investment provided supporting evidence in favor of value added and risk 
sharing hypotheses. 
In view of the exacerbated risks, uncertainty and business complexity with OSS 
entrepreneurial ventures, we expect that VCs financing such ventures will provide investment through 
syndication. Because the syndication will allow VCs to reduce downward risk of investing  by 
spreading it among inventors and can add value and help to deal with complexity and uncertainty by 
bringing together more expertise and resources (Brander et al, 2002),  This proposition is formally 
stated as the following hypothesis: 
H2b: VCs that finance entrepreneurial ventures with OSS business model are more likely to 
provide intensive monitoring and governance through syndication. 
In this subsequent section of this paper, we empirically investigate developed hypotheses by 
examining the quality of VC finance and VC governance post investment.   
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
To build the sample of firms analyzed in the present paper, we first considered VC-backed software 
entrepreneurial ventures16 included in the SDC Platinum (former VentureXpert) database which met 
the following criteria: i) they were located in the North America (USA and Canada); ii) they received 
their first round of VC investment in the period 1994-2008, and iii) they were 10 years old or younger 
at the time of the first VC round. 4336 companies met these three criteria.  
In order to detect OSS entrepreneurial ventures, we resorted to three different sources of 
information. First, following O’Mahony (β00β) and Dahlander (β007), we examined the business 
descriptions provided by VentureXpert. 14 ventures turned out to have adopted an OSS business 
model. We identify these ventures by searching the word “open source” in the business description 
and after reading it, the ones that clearly referred to entrepreneurial ventures developing OSS were 
labeled as OSS entrepreneurial ventures. Second, we added to this group the 67 entrepreneurial 
ventures that were mentioned in “The 451 group” report (Aslett, 2009, 2010) as OSS ventures. Aslett 
(2009, 2010) provide an insight about OSS entrepreneurial ventures which were able to receive VC 
investment in the period of 1997-2010. Among approximately 130 ventures mentioned in the reports, 
we were able to identify 67 of them which are included in the sample extracted from SDC. In this 
sample, 11 ventures were mentioned also in VentureXpert.  Third, in accordance with the procedure 
used by Fosfuri et al. (2008), we extracted from the Gale Group PROMT and ASAP databases all 
articles about new product announcements17 that met the following criteria: i) the article was published 
in the period 1994-2011, ii) it referred to the SIC code 7372 (software), and iii) it included one or 
more of the following words: "Open source", "OSS", "FLOSS (free libre open source software)", 
"Linux", "Apache", or "free software". We extracted about 1500 product announcements. In order to 
classify a product announcement as relating to an OSS company, all of the extracted announcements 
were carefully read by a trained research assistant and checked by one of the authors (Appendix 1 
shows examples of the product announcements). In this way, we selected 54 additional companies. 
Altogether, we identified 124 OSS companies.18 This group includes entrepreneurial ventures which 
received scholarly and public attention such as SugarCRM, Red Hat Inc, JasperSoft Corporation and 
SpikeSource, Inc. 
                                                          
16
 Our sample does not include entrepreneurial ventures which did not receive VC. Indeed, we do not study whether OSS entrepreneurial 
ventures are more or less likely to attract VC investments than their proprietary software counterparts. Rather we focus our analysis on the 
quality of the VC investors which are attracted by OSS entrepreneurial ventures and the governance of their VC investments, conditional on 
having obtained VC.   
17
 In order to detect whether an article was about a new product announcement, we checked whether the following words were included in 
the article: “product announcement”, “product introduction”,”product/service review”, and “software evaluation”. 
18
 This sample is larger than those used by prior studies that focused on OSS entrepreneurial ventures. For instance, Wen et al. (2012) 
identified 85 OSS companies and Dahlander (2007) 67 OSS companies.  
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In order to build a control group composed of proprietary software entrepreneurial ventures, 
we considered all software product announcements extracted from the Gale Group PROMT and ASAP 
databases which met the above mentioned criteria i) and ii). Then we searched in these documents for 
the name of the remaining 4,212 VentureXpert companies while excluding the 124 companies 
identified as OSS companies. To be sure these ventures do not have any OSS product we manually 
read the documents. In this way, we were able to identify 390 proprietary software entrepreneurial 
ventures19. 
The final sample includes 514 software entrepreneurial ventures which received VC 
investment from 1,035 unique VC firms. The analysis is at the dyad level. We consider the 6,555 
dyads that correspond to an investment by VC firm i in an entrepreneurial venture j. 2,029 of these 
dyads refer to OSS entrepreneurial ventures while the remaining 4,526 refer to proprietary software 
entrepreneurial ventures.  
3.2. Variables  
3.2.1. Independent Variables 
The key independent variable in the empirical analysis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
portfolio company in the focal dyad is an OSS entrepreneurial venture and 0 if it is a proprietary 
software entrepreneurial venture (OSS).  
3.2.2. Dependent Variables 
VC quality: It is agreed that the quality of VC firms is quite heterogeneous, with some VC 
firms having better screening, monitoring and coaching ability because of greater investment 
experience. Accordingly, the first set of dependent variables measures the quality of VC investors 
through several proxies of their investment experience. 20 
General experienceij is the cumulative number of rounds of investments in which VC firm i 
was involved prior to the investment in portfolio company j since 198021. Since each VC round 
involves interaction with and evaluation of entrepreneurial ventures, in each round VC firms acquire 
                                                          
19
  To be sure they are proprietary we also read their business description provided by VentureXpert. 
20
 There are alternative measures of experience such as age of the VC firm and the number of companies in which VC firms invested 
(Gompers 1996 and Hochberg et al, 2007). Following Sorensen (2007) we do not consider these variables since for example age does not 
differentiate between active and inactive investors. Similarly number of companies can be misleading since investments can happen in early 
stage or late stage. While VC firms which enter in early stages and help ventures to grow gain experiences which can be more relevant in 
value-added service to the future investments in comparison to VCs which invest in the late stage. VCs that enter in the early stage 
participate in more investment rounds. Hence, considering number of companies VC invested in, cannot distinguish between VCs which 
invest from the early stage and VCs that invest only in the late stages.  
21
 In order to calculate the general experience, industry specialization and IPO experience, we limited the sample to after 1980. Since till late 
70s the VC market was very small and by change in policy at  1979, in which the U.S. Department of Labor clarified the “prudent man” 
stipulation in the Employment Retirement Income Security Act to allow pension funds to invest in VCs, the VC market grow dramatically 
(Gompers and Lerner, 2001).  
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knowledge and expertise regarding different aspects of the VC market and factors influencing success 
or failure of portfolio companies. This valuable knowledge and expertise has a direct positive impact 
on the screening, monitoring and coaching ability of the VC firm (Hsu, 2006).  In addition to learning, 
while participating in more rounds VC firms gain access to a larger network of potential suppliers, 
customers and executives, which in turn can be helpful to their portfolio companies  (Sorensen, 2007). 
Industry experienceij is the ratio of the cumulative number of VC rounds in information 
technology entrepreneurial ventures in which VC firm i was involved to the total number of its VC 
rounds prior to the investment in portfolio company j. It captures the specialization of VC firms in 
information technology sector.  
IPO experienceij measures the number of rounds the focal VC firm invested in entrepreneurial 
ventures which went public. An IPO is considered as the most successful exit for VC investments 
(Sorensen, 2007; Brander et al, 2002). So this variable reflects the ability of VC firms to select high 
quality entrepreneurial ventures and/or to monitor, coach and position them after the investment 
(Cumming et al, 2011).   
Capital under managementij is calculated as the logarithm of the total amount invested by VC 
firm i in its portfolio companies in the 5 years prior to the first investment in company j. We use this 
variable as a proxy for the ability of the focal VC firm to attract investment, which in turn is allegedly 
correlated with performance and reputation of the VC firm.  
Connectednessij ; it is well known that VC firms often syndicate their investments with other 
VC firms rather than investing alone, thereby creating a network of investment relationships with 
other VC firms. Hochberg et al. (2007) have shown that VC firms that enjoy more influential network 
positions exhibit better performance than other VC firms. Connectednessij measures how well 
networked VC firm i was at the time of its investment in company j.  For this purpose, we calculated 
the co-investment relationships VC firm i had with other VC firms in the 5 preceding years. For the 
main analysis, we consider betweeness centrality22. Betweeness centrality measures ability of VC to 
bring VCs with complementary skills together. To make sure data are comparable over time, we 
normalized this figure by dividing it by the number of possible relationships.  
Governance: We considered the governance of VC investment as reflected by use of staging 
and syndication. The VC literature has documented that in order to minimize downward risk and 
create efficient incentives for entrepreneurs, VC firms give portfolio companies funding in several 
rounds of financing rather than as an upfront investment of the entire required capital. This practice 
allows them to preserve the option to abandon the project if the entrepreneurial venture fails to reach 
                                                          
22
 It is calculated formally, let pjk be the proportion of all paths linking actors j and k that pass through actor i. Actor i’s betweenness is 
defined as ϕpjk   ී i ≠ j ≠ k.  We also used Normalized degree of centrality. The variable determines the number of unique VC firms with 
which a VC firm has co-invested. Formally, Let bij = 1 if at least one syndication relationship exists between VCs i and j, and zero 
otherwise. VC i’s degree then equals ϕj bij (Hochberg et al., 2007). The results are qualitatively similar. They are not reported in the paper 
and are available upon request. 
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the agreed milestones (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers, 1995). To capture the risk perception of VC firms 
regarding the investee entrepreneurial ventures we consider two variables;  Number of rounds defined 
as the total number of VC rounds received by the focal entrepreneurial ventures, with a greater number 
of rounds being associated with greater perceived risk. Similarly, VC firms enter deal with their peers 
in order to spread the investment risk, obtain better information on and a more accurate evaluation of 
the investee entrepreneurial venture, and provide it with more added value. We proxy the extent of 
syndication with the variable Syndication size, defined as the number of VC firms that co-invested in 
the same round (Lerner, 1994).23   
3.2.3. Controls 
In the empirical model, we control for characteristics of VC firms, entrepreneurial ventures, 
investment deal and the general economic environment.  
Characteristics of VC firms, A lead VC investor plays a crucial role in VC investment. A lead 
VC investor takes a more active role than other investors in the interaction with entrepreneurial 
ventures and makes key decisions (e.g. whether to syndicate). Lead investor i is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 when VC firm i is the lead investor and 0 otherwise. In order to determine who is the lead 
investor, following previous literature (e.g, Sorenson, 2007) we considered the VC firm that makes the 
largest total investment in the focal entrepreneurial venture across all VC rounds as the lead investor. 
VC firms differ depending on their ownership and governance (e.g. Dimov and Gelajdovic 
2010), which in turn influence their objectives and investment strategies. We controlled for the VC 
type through 5 dummy variables that indicate that the investor is a private VC, a corporate VC, a bank 
affiliated VC, an individual (including angel investors) or other VC type. 
Characteristics of entrepreneurial venture, We also control for the stage in which it was at the first 
round of the investment (Early stage). Early stage investments are riskier (Gompers and Lerner, 1999) 
since entrepreneurial ventures usually lack a financial performance and require large effort to achieve 
success . The VCs and entrepreneurial ventures tend to cluster in special regions. In the North America 
majority of VC investments are in California and Massachusetts; hence, we control for geographical 
location of entrepreneurial ventures by two dummy variables of California and Massachusetts which 
indicate whether they are located in California or Massachusetts. Several studies showed the role of 
patents in attracting VC investment (e.g. Mann and Sager, 2007).  When the information imperfection 
exists, the patents matter more as signal of quality (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2011). For entrepreneurial 
ventures Patent measures the number of patent applications by entrepreneurial venture j prior to the 
year in which it received the VC investment. Considering the application year instead of the grant year 
                                                          
23
 Some previous studies on syndication measure the size of the syndicate with the number of VC firms that invested in the focal 
entrepreneurial venture23 (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Cumming et al, 2011). For robustness, in this paper we also used this definition of 
syndicate size (Syndication size 2). In addition, we use Syndication as dummy variable denoting syndicated investments (Brander et al, 
2002). In both cases, the results are similar. For brevity the results are not reported and are available upon request. 
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is justified since application is closer to innovation time and patenting procedure can take several 
months (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2011; Tian and Wang, 2011).  We also control for the sub-sector of the 
software industry in which the entrepreneurial venture j operated, based on The North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) provided by VentureXpert. We used three dummy variables 
which indicate whether entrepreneurial venture primary sub-sector is "Software Publishers”, "Software 
Reproducing”, or “Others”.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Characteristics of the deal, at the time of the first round of VC investment, information 
asymmetry is substantially greater than in correspondence with subsequent rounds. Indeed, the receipt 
of the first VC round gives to uninformed third parties a signal of the good quality of the focal 
entrepreneurial venture, thereby reducing the extent of the information asymmetries (Li, 2008). First 
roundij is a dummy variable indicating that the focal dyad relates to the first round of funding. We also 
control for the age of entrepreneurial venture at the time of the VC investment (Age)24. Information 
asymmetries between entrepreneurs and investors are greater for younger firms that lack a track record 
(Sorensen, 2007). 
Finally, we consider several variables that reflect general market and macroeconomic conditions. 
Number of dealsij is a proxy for the size of the VC market and S&P index controls for public market 
situation (Cumming et al, 2011).  Following Nahata (2008) we resort to two dummy variables to 
account for the booming information technology market in the period 1998-2000 and the market crash 
due to the financial crisis in the period 2007-2009.  Table 1 provides a summary statistics and 
definition of main variables. 
For robustness purpose in order to control for differences in quality of entrepreneurial ventures 
following Bengtsson and Hsu, (2010) we examine whether it is favorable for OSS entrepreneurial 
ventures to exit successfully. We do so by looking at the current status of entrepreneurial venture 
whether it goes public, bought by other companies, still active or went defunct. IPO is the most 
successful exit option and provide highest return to investors (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).  The 
second best option is through acquisition. Following prior studies we use a dummy variable equal to 
one if entrepreneurial venture exited through IPO or were acquired (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; 
Sorensen, 2007; Nahata, 2008; Tian, 2012). 
 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 illustrates descriptive statistics of variables. It also illustrates univariate analysis   of 
differences in the value of the dependent variables between OSS and proprietary software 
entrepreneurial ventures.  
                                                          
24
 There are some mistakes in the entrepreneurial ventures’ founding year as reported by VentureXpert. Whenever we face with companies 
for which the year of foundation is posterior to the year of the first VC round, we replaced the founding year with the year of the first VC 
round. 
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The VC firms which invest in OSS entrepreneurial ventures (Proprietary) on average participated in 
414.12 (288.29) prior investment rounds. Similarly, VC firms which invest in OSS entrepreneurial 
ventures (Proprietary) on average 79.78 (73.35 %) of prior investments were in information 
technology. This verifies in general that VC firms are highly specialized in an industry (Gupta and 
Sapienza, 1992). 
The average IPO experience of VC firms invested in OSS entrepreneurial ventures (Proprietary) is 
88.34 (61.97). Data indicates that VC firms invested in OSS entrepreneurial ventures (Proprietary) on 
average have 10.52 (9.43) capital under management (in logarithm of total amount invested in the last 
5 year). Similarly we can see that VC firms invested in OSS entrepreneurial ventures (Proprietary) on 
average have 0.61% (0.49%) betweenness centrality. The univariate analysis verifies that quality of 
VC investors is higher for OSS entrepreneurial ventures. The differences regarding mean and median 
of both groups (OSS vs. Proprietary) are statistically significant at 1% level. 
Regarding governance we look at number of rounds and syndication size. VC funding was given to 
OSS entrepreneurial ventures (Proprietary) in 6.68 (5.83) rounds, while the median is equal to 6 (5) 
rounds. Both mean and median are significantly different at 1% level. The mean of syndication size in 
OSS entrepreneurial venture (Proprietary) is 4.72 (4.89). The median of syndication size is 4 for all 
software entrepreneurial ventures.  
For robustness, we we use a dummy variable whether VCs co-invested with at least one peer or 
invested solely. 92.91% ( 86.63%) of OSS entrepreneurial ventures (Proprietary) receive VC funding 
from more than one VC firm. For all software entrepreneurial venture the amount is 88.14%, which is 
similar to the reported amount by Tian (2012) for all entrepreneurial ventures which exited through 
IPO. 
Regarding control variables, 82% percent of entrepreneurial ventures do not file any patent prior to the 
first round of investment and 66% of them do not file any patents in all investment rounds. This is 
slightly lower than what Mann and Sager (2007) showed in the period of 1997-1999, 91% of software 
entrepreneurial ventures do not file any patent prior the first round of investment. 47.28% of 
observations belong to entrepreneurial ventures located in California and 16.51% in Massachusetts. 
Private VCs accounts for 71.45% of observations. 
[Table 2 about here] 
3.4. Empirical Methodology 
In this study we focus on impact of collaboration with community of users on VC investment. 
Respectively, we study quality of VC firms and terms of financing. In all models (j) is referring to 
entrepreneurial venture, (i) is representing VC firm. 
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3.4.1. VC quality 
In this section we study impact of collaboration with community of users on quality of financing 
entrepreneurial ventures which they are able to acquire.  We analyze this in the following 
specification:  
VCQualityij=ȕ0+ ȕ 1 OSSj+ B2 DEALij+ B3 VCi+ ȕ4 PCj + ȕ5 Yt+ İij 
In this model VCQualityij
 
refers to quality of VC firm (i.e., General experience, Industry specific 
experience, IPO experience, VC capital under management and connectedness). In this model, we 
treat General experience, IPO experience and VC capital under management as continuous variables 
and estimate the model  by Ordinary Least Square model (OLS).  Since industry specific experience 
and connectedness can get value between 0 and 100 we are able to treat them as double censored 
variables. Therefore, we use the Tobit regression model (Long, 1997). Since in our sample we have 
several observations belonging to an entrepreneurial venture we cluster errors around entrepreneurial 
ventures. 
3.4.2. Governance 
We also look at governance of investment. Since the measures we used are positive integers, we use 
count models for analyzing governance of investment as following:  
 ൫   ୧୨ห ൯ ൌ    ቂȾଵǤ    ୨ ൅෍Ƚ୧Ǥ     ୧୨ ൅෍ɀ୧Ǥ   ୧ ൅෍Ʌ୧ Ǥ   ୨ ൅෍Ɂ୧ Ǥ  ୲ቃ 
In this setting    ୧୨ is representing two variables of number of rounds which funding was given to 
entrepreneurial ventures and syndication size. Given there is no high dispersion in our variables, the 
general assumptions underlying Poisson models, suggesting adopting Poisson model. Alternatively we 
repeated all models with negative Binomial model in order to test robustness of our results to choice of 
models. The results are similar. All error terms are clustered around entrepreneurial venture. 
Additionally, as an alternative for syndication size we use a dummy variable for existence of more 
than one VC firm in the deal; therefore we use a Logit model (The results are not reported for brevity 
and are available upon request). Table 3 reports the pair wise correlation of all variables in both 
models. 
[Table 3 about here] 
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4. Results 
4.1. VC quality 
Table 4 indicates results from OLS and Tobit model which regress measures of VC quality on a 
dummy variable that represent whether entrepreneurial venture has business model based on open 
source (OSS). The model also includes control variables which control for VC characteristics; five 
dummy variables indicate whether investor is Private VC, Corporate VC, Bank affiliate VC, 
Individuals or other type, in addition to a dummy variable which indicate if VC is lead investor. As 
well as entrepreneurial venture characteristics, including a dummy indicating first round of investment 
was early stage or not, two dummy variable indicating whether entrepreneurial venture is in California 
or Massachusetts and three dummy variables indicating the sub-sector of entrepreneurial venture and 
number of patent application prior funding. We also control for deal characteristics which are whether 
it is first round of investment or not and age at the round of funding. Additionally, we control for 
macroeconomics variables which can have impact on VC investment. We include number of VC 
deals, the return on S&P 500 index, a dummy whether year of investment is in information technology 
bubble (1998-2000) and a dummy for financial crisis (2007-2009). 
Models 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 indicate that the OSS entrepreneurial ventures are associated with higher 
quality VC, consistent with H1. Higher quality is identified through general experience (total number 
of prior deals across all industries), VC’s industry specific experience (number of prior deals VC 
invested in information technology relative to total number of prior deals), IPO experience (number of 
rounds invested in entrepreneurial venture which went public), capital under management (logarithmic 
of total amount invested in entrepreneurial ventures) and connectedness (betweenness centrality in 
syndication network). In the model 1 the effect is significant at 10% level. While in model 2, 3, 4 and 
5 effect is significant at 1% level. The results are not only significant statistically but also 
economically. OSS entrepreneurial ventures receive funding from VC firms which on average have 
invested in 72.10 more deals which account about 25% more than average general experience of 
sample. In addition have 3.63% higher industry specialization.  Similarly have 25.59 more IPO exits 
which imply VC firms that invest in OSS entrepreneurial ventures have on average 35% more IPO 
experience in comparison with the mean of sample. When we look at capital under management the 
coefficient imply that VC firms that invest in OSS entrepreneurial venture have on average 0.56 
Million dollars more capital under management and their betweenness centrality is 0.18% more which 
means they are about 30% more connected relative to the mean of sample.   
[Table 4 about here] 
Regarding other variables, we can observe impact of patent on quality of VC firm. This is in line with 
finding which shows impact of intellectual property rights on VC investment (Mann and Sager, 2007; 
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Hsu and Ziedonis, 2011). As it was expected, lead investors are more experienced. Similarly Private, 
Bank and Corporate VC are more experienced. Entrepreneurial ventures in California and 
Massachusetts receive funding from higher quality VCs. In the bubble average quality of VC firms 
dropped since there was a surge in the number of entrepreneurial ventures , similarly in financial crisis 
the quality of VC firms increase since business opportunities and fund shrinks and only well respected 
VCs are able to raise fund and invest. 
4.2. Governance 
As it was argued above (H2a and H2b), in order to analysis the governance of VC investment we use 
two variables of number of rounds VC funding was given to entrepreneurial venture and syndication 
size. Since the number of rounds is measured as total number of VC investment firm received and is 
not time variant, we limit the analysis to only dyads in the first round of investment. Therefore, the 
sample drops to 1,177 observations. For the analysis we use count models (Poisson)25. Empirical 
results in model 1 and 2 show OSS entrepreneurial ventures receive VC funding in more rounds. Since 
it was shown that OSS entrepreneurial ventures receive investment from higher quality VCs, one 
might argue the observed differences can be due to difference in risk tolerance of VCs with different 
qualities. In order to solve this problem in model 2 we control for VC quality (IPO experience), the 
results are still pointing in more rounds of investment for OSS entrepreneurial ventures. The 
coefficients in both models are statistically significant at 1% level. The coefficient in model 1 implies 
that OSS entrepreneurial ventures receive VC funding on average in 1.1 more rounds. In general, we 
find supportive evidence for H2a.  
We do not observe significant differences in syndication size between OSS entrepreneurial ventures 
and proprietary ones. The Model 3 and 4 verifies that there are no significant differences among OSS 
entrepreneurial ventures and proprietary ones. We cannot claim any support for H2b.  
  [Table 5 about here] 
The control variables show entrepreneurial ventures that receive VC funding in older age, the numbers 
of rounds reduce. In software publishing and software reproduction sub sectors the number rounds 
increase. From model for syndication size we can see more patent applications are associated with 
larger syndicates. By increase in VC market size syndication size increases.   
                                                          
25
 For robustness we also consider negative binomial model, the result are robust to choice of econometric model and are available upon 
request. 
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4.3. Robustness Checks 
In order to check robustness of our results we run several different alternative analyses. 
First, there is heterogeneity among OSS entrepreneurial ventures. In order to study the heterogeneity 
of OSS entrepreneurial ventures we imply two approaches. Primarily, in constructing our sample we 
used three sources. This allows us to separate OSS entrepreneurial ventures in two different groups. In 
the first group, we focus on a more conservative definition of the OSS entrepreneurial ventures and 
consider only entrepreneurial ventures the business model of which is based on open source, as 
described by VentureXpert or by “The 451 group” reports (i.e. we include only firms identified in 
steps 1 and 2 of the procedure described above).  These firms are de noted by a value equal to 1 of the 
dummy OSS 1.  We put the rest of entrepreneurial ventures which we were able to identify at least one 
open source product for them in the separate group (OSS2). While the coefficient in most of models is 
larger for OSS1 which their business model is entirely based on OSS. The test of difference between 
coefficients of OSS1 and OSS2 shows there are no significant differences between both groups. 
Appendix 2 reports the model for quality of VC and governance. 
Secondly, Fosfuri et al (2008) shows that endowment of intellectual property of venture impact its 
decisions on releasing OSS products. Hence, we divided OSS dyads to two groups.  The one in which 
entrepreneurial ventures filed a patent prior to investment (OSS with patent) and the one in which it 
did not filed any patents prior to investment (OSS no patent). Similar to previous robustness check the 
test of difference shows there is no significant differences between two groups. Appendix 3 reports the 
result for VC quality and governance. 
Propensity Score Matching:  in the empirical setting we compared the entrepreneurial venture based 
on whether they develop product with collaboration with community of users or not.  In order to 
ensure that the non-randomness of the sample does not bias results toward the conclusion, we employ 
propensity score matching, by using nearest neighbor methodology on VC characteristics (Lead 
investor, Private, Corporate, and Individual), entrepreneurial venture characteristics (number of 
patents, age at investment round, geographical location and sub sectors), deal characteristics (First 
investment) and macroeconomics factors (VC market size, Bubble and Financial crisis). As appendix 
4 and 5 depicts the sample size drops to 5,462 observations belonging to 388 entrepreneurial ventures 
while 101 of them are OSS.  The results of univariate analysis on matched sample  (Appendix 4) 
confirm VCs that invest in OSS entrepreneurial ventures are more experienced, consistent with H1, 
and OSS entrepreneurial ventures receives funding in  more rounds  and from larger syndication, 
consistent with H2a and H2b. The results are not only significant statistically but also economically. 
While by controlling for confounding factors in Appendix 5 we can see that results are qualitatively 
similar to analysis of full sample in previous part (Supports for H1 and H2a but no support for H2b). 
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One might argue that they are unobserved heterogeneity in the quality of entrepreneurial ventures. In 
other word, there are unobserved factors which can impact the quality of VC firms which invest, since 
higher quality VCs are able to identify better ventures. One of these major factors can be quality of 
entrepreneurial ventures and business opportunity they offer. Even though the quality of 
entrepreneurial ventures is uncertain and hard to evaluate ex-ante, we assume that they are observed 
factors such as quality of entrepreneurial team, technology and business opportunity which to some 
extend can predict the success of entrepreneurial venture. Therefore, we control for quality of 
entrepreneurial venture, measured by successful exit, (Merger and acquisition & IPO). The results 
support H1 and are qualitatively similar. The results are not reported and are available upon request. 
Endogenity check: since selecting to be OSS or proprietary for an entrepreneurial venture is not 
random, endogeneity may be a potential problem. First following Vella and Verbeek (1999) by using 
instrumental variables and Heckman treatment model in estimating VC quality (in appendix 7 we 
explain the models formally) we control for endogeneity. In both models we consider a two stage 
model (control function) where entrepreneurial ventures choose to adopt open source business model 
or not based on intensity of the individuals with PhD degree in computer science and with hacking 
abilities in the region. We measure the intensity by dividing number of cyber crimes and PhD 
graduates in computer science to active work forces in each US state26. The logic here is the driving 
forces of open source entrepreneurial ventures are highly skilled individuals in programming and 
software development. We resort on this idea that the highly skilled programmers can be found among 
PhD graduates and self educated hackers. The results verify that VCs that invest in OSS 
entrepreneurial ventures have higher quality and when we control for endogeneity both the size and 
statistical significance of coefficient are enhanced. Appendix 6 report the result of instrumental 
variable and Heckman treatment model for general experience of VC27. The negative and significant 
coefficient of lambda (Ȝ) implies that there is a negative correlation between unobserved factors in 
selection equation (error term) and VC quality.  Hence, by control for endogeneity the coefficient of 
main dependent variable increases. 
Alternatively we use a switching regression model. In this model VC quality are allowed to differ 
according whether entrepreneurial venture is OSS or proprietary (Bertschek and Kaiser, 2004). 
Therefore, we resort on two regimes of OSS and proprietary. This is possible by considering a 
selection model which determines the probability of an entrepreneurial venture to be OSS or 
                                                          
26
 We were not able to find similar information about Canada, therefore we limit our sample to US based entrepreneurial ventures, The 
sample include 6400 observations (155 observation less than original sample). 
27
  The results for other variables are not reported for brevity and are available upon request from authors. 
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proprietary (regime equation)28.  Switching regression allows us to estimate the VC quality of OSS 
entrepreneurial ventures if the same ventures were in proprietary regime29. The appendix 8 shows 
conditional distribution of the VC quality (Capital under management). The method allows us to 
control whether OSS and proprietary entrepreneurial ventures are systematically different30. This is 
possible by using the selectivity terms (inverse Mills ratio) calculated from regime equation (see 
appendix 9 for the formal description of model).  The inverse Mill ratio captures unobservable 
information. Then we are able to regress VC quality of inverse mills ratio and control variables for 
OSS and proprietary entrepreneurial ventures separately. Appendix 8a represents conditional 
distribution of VC quality for OSS entrepreneurial ventures. The solid line represent the kernel density 
of VC quality of OSS entrepreneurial ventures from OSS regime while the dashed line represent the 
kernel density of VC quality of OSS entrepreneurial ventures if they were proprietary. Similarly in the 
appendix 8b we observe VC quality for proprietary entrepreneurial ventures. The solid line represent 
the kernel density of VC quality of proprietary entrepreneurial ventures from proprietary regime while 
the dashed line represent the kernel density of VC quality of proprietary entrepreneurial ventures if 
they were OSS. Both graphs show changes from OSS to proprietary (Proprietary to OSS) is associated 
with increase (decrease) in the VC quality.                                                                                                                              
5. Conclusion and Discussion 
In this paper, in an explorative fashion we investigate impact of OBM on the quality of VCs and the 
Governance of deals. This research is motivated by the fact that there are growing numbers of 
entrepreneurial ventures which are adopting OBM in order to support their innovation processes.  
These ventures are known by two distinctive features: of lack of reliance on IP and development in 
collaboration with agents outside firm boundaries (Mann, 2006). Research have shown entrepreneurial 
ventures by relying on communities of users are able to access to resources outside firm boundaries 
and generate high quality technology and products in lower cost (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; 
Chesbrough, 2003, 2006; von Hipple, 1988, 2005).  
On the other hand, since entrepreneurial ventures cannot use traditional appropriability mechanisms to 
the fullest extent and should deal with agents, who do not have contractual ties to the entrepreneurial 
ventures, they are facing higher uncertainty and complexity in comparison with entrepreneurial 
ventures.  
                                                          
28
 Similar to the previous model entrepreneurial ventures choose to adopt open source business model or not based on intensity of the 
individuals with PhD degree in computer science and with hacking abilities in the region. 
29
 Chemmananur et al (β011) refers to this type of analysis as “what-if” questions. 
30
 This procedure is explained in detail in Heckman(1979) and Maddala( 1983). 
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We draw our conclusion based on a sample of 514 software entrepreneurial ventures that received VC 
funding in 6,555 different deals. Empirical analysis shows software entrepreneurial venture that that 
adopted OBM receive funding from higher quality VCs.  The result can be driven from two different 
explanations. Firstly, VC’s resource endowment and expertise help VCs to tolerate higher risk level 
and help to deal with business complexity. Secondly, high quality VCs are able to screen more 
efficiently and match with high quality entrepreneurial ventures (Hsu, 2004). We tested the second one 
by looking at successful exit (Merger and acquisition & IPO). The empirical analysis rolled out the 
second explanation since there are no differences in both variables between OSS and Proprietary 
entrepreneurial ventures. 
In case of governance, results depict OSS entrepreneurial ventures on average receive VC funding in 
more rounds, but we did not find any significant differences in case of syndication size. 
Staging more frequently allows VCs to monitor entrepreneur efforts and actions, reduce agency cost 
and reduce downward risk by avoiding inefficient continuation through the exit option. The results can 
be explained by that the higher risk and complexity associated with investment increase likelihood of 
staging since value of the exit option is highly correlated with risk of investment (Li, 2008).  
A possible explanation for observing no differences in syndication size despite expected higher risk 
and complexity associated with OSS entrepreneurial ventures can be that syndication can increase 
coordination cost and lead to delay in decision making (Gompers and Lerner, 1999) which is more 
severe for OSS entrepreneurial ventures which have a complex business model. As it was argued the 
speed to market has higher importance for OSS entrepreneurial ventures. Since syndication can cause 
delay in decision making process, it is possible that VCs are less inclined to syndicate to avoid delay 
in decision making.   
In this study contribute to two stream of literature. First, there are growing bodies of literature which 
have studied OBM, with special focus on OSS. The initial studies focused on understanding the 
motivation of contributors (e.g. Lerner and Tirole, 2002; von Hippel and von Krough, 2003; 
O’Mahony and Ferrero, β007). By the growing number of firms that commercialize OSS software 
researchers investigate determinant of introducing open source products (Fosfuri et al, 2008; Wen et 
al, 2011), challenges and strategies for benefiting from open source communities (Dahlander and 
Magnusson, 2005; 2008; West and Gallagher, 2006; Bonaccorsi et al, 2006) and impact on 
performance of ventures (Piva et al, 2012; Stam, 2009).  However, scholars have rarely explored the 
financing of firm involving in community collaboration (see Alexy & George, 2011, for an exception). 
Our study differs from Alexy and George (2011) in two distinctive features. First while, Alexy and 
George (2013) focus on adoption of OBM by publicly listed firms, we study entrepreneurial ventures, 
which are designed on delivering product and services based on OBM. Secondly, in contrary to Alexy 
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and George (2013) that explores the impact of OBM on the market value of firm, we focus on 
different dimensions of VC investment in OSS entrepreneurial ventures in comparison with 
proprietary ones. Finally, we contribute to this literature by offering unique data, to the best of our 
knowledge the most comprehensive, on OSS entrepreneurial ventures and by providing understanding 
on which type of VC and how they invest in OSS entrepreneurial ventures.  
Second, the paper contributes to the strand of literature that investigates the relationship between 
entrepreneurial venture’s characteristics and VC investment. Mann & Sager (β008), Hsu & Ziedonis 
(2008) and Engel and Keilbach (2007) study the role of patents on valuation of entrepreneurial 
ventures, the propensity of receiving VC financing, the terms of financing and return on investment 
measured by exit status. Hellmann and Puri (2000), by focusing on product market strategy, show VCs 
are more willing to invest in innovator entrepreneurial ventures rather than imitator ones. Davila et al 
(2003) studied the interaction between employee growth of entrepreneurial ventures and VC 
financing. Hsu (2007) looks at entrepreneur experience and education. He finds prior founding 
experience, education in PhD level and social network of founder increases the likelihood of VC 
funding. Cumming et al (2011) studied the impact of litigation on VC investment. Empirical studies 
treat entrepreneurial venture homogenous regarding their business models.  We contribute to this 
studies by focusing on different business models (open VS. closed) of entrepreneurial ventures and its 
impact on VC financing. 
We end with some thoughts about future research. We have been able to identify entrepreneurial 
ventures which collaborate with community of users. But it has been shown there is a large variance in 
business models of OSS entrepreneurial ventures.  By growing number of OSS entrepreneurial 
ventures, one might study relationship between VC investment and different business models. In 
addition, in utilizing communities firms can apply different strategies, for example Dahlander (2007) 
showed entrepreneurial venture can utilize existing communities or initiate a new community. 
Moreover, the entrepreneurial ventures can be categorized based on level of activity in community. 
The future study can identify different categories of community collaboration and evaluate whether 
investors differentiate between them or not. 
In this study we only focused on VC investment while future studies can study impact of VC 
investment on performance of OSS entrepreneurial ventures in comparison with proprietary one. The 
performance can be measured by several different proxies such as number of products, financial 
performance, exit and exit valuation.  It would be also interesting to study OBM by looking at a 
different industry in which similar setting can be identified.   
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Tables: 
 
Table 1-Summary Statistics and Variable Definitions 
Dependent variables N Mean 
Std. 
dev 
Min Max 
VC quality      
VC’s general  
experience (1) 
Number of investments in all industries  prior 
funding date 
VentureXpert 5465 328.67 547.91 0 6663 
VC’s industry 
specific experience 
(2) 
Number of deal VC invested in information 
technology relative to total number of 
investments  prior funding date ( in 
percentage) 
VentureXpert 5465 75.41 22.87 0 100 
IPO experience (3) number of rounds invested in entrepreneurial 
venture which went public 
VentureXpert 5465 70.43 132.55 0 908 
Capital under 
management (log) 
(4) 
Logarithmic of total amount VC invested in 
entrepreneurial venture in the 5 years prior 
investment date ( $ Thousands) 
VentureXpert 5462 9.78 4.42 0 16.63 
Connectedness (5) Between centrality in syndication network of 
preceding 5 years. 
 5465 0.53 1.23 0 11.09 
Governance      
Number of funding 
rounds (6) 
The number of round entrepreneurial venture 
received VC funding 
VentureXpert 1177 4.09 2.74 1 18 
Syndication size (7) The number of VC firms co-invested at the 
same deal in an entrepreneurial venture 
VentureXpert 6555 4.84 3.17 1 18 
Independent Variable      
OSS (8) 
A dummy=1 if  entrepreneurial venture has an 
open source product or its business model is 
entirely based on open source 
Promt, ASAP, 
VentureXpert and 
“Open to Invest” 
6555 0.31 .46 0 1 
Control Variables      
VC characteristics      
Lead investor (9) 
A dummy=1 if VC firm made largest amount 
of funding across all rounds in entrepreneurial 
venture 
VentureXpert 6555 0.27 0.44 0 1 
VC type (10), (11), 
(12), (13) 
five dummy variables which indicates 
whether VC is a Private VC, Corporate VC, 
Bank Affiliated VC, Individuals or Others 
VentureXpert      
Entrepreneurial Venture Characteristics      
Early stage (21) 
A dummy=1 if first round of VC funding is in 
seed or early stage 
VentureXpert 6555 0.78 0.41 0 1 
California (15) 
A dummy variables indicating entrepreneurial 
venture is in California 
VentureXpert 6555 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Massachusetts (16) 
A dummy variables indicating entrepreneurial 
venture is in Massachusetts 
VentureXpert 6555 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Sub-sector (17), 
(18) 
Three dummy variables indicating whether 
entrepreneurial venture primary sub-sector is 
"Software Publishers" or "Software 
Reproducing" or “others”. 
VentureXpert      
Patents (19) The cumulative number of patent application EPO.org 6555 1.82 5.98 0 70 
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prior to funding year 
Deal Characteristics      
First round (20) A dummy=1 if it is first round of VC funding VentureXpert 6555 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Company age (14) 
Investment date- entrepreneurial venture 
founding year 
VentureXpert 6555 4.07 2.98 0 21 
Macroeconomics conditions      
VC market size 
(22) 
Logarithmic number of VC deals in time of 
funding 
VentureXpert 6555 10.12 0.38 8.76 10.72 
S&P index (23) The rerun on S&P 500 index Standard & Poor 6555 0.14 0.19 
-
0.37 
0.37 
Bubble (24) A dummy=1 if year of funding is 1999-2000  6555 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Crisis (25) A dummy=1 if year of funding is 2007-2009  6555 0.23 0.42 0 1 
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Table 2- Differences in VC quality and VC governance of OSS and Proprietary entrepreneurial 
ventures. 
Variable N Mean Median Test of equality (P-Value) 
Mean Median 
 
All PC 5465 328.67 124   
OSS 1754 414.12 169 0.00 0.00 
Proprietary 3711 288.29 105 
VC’s industry specific experience (%) 
All PC 5465 75.41 80.47   
OSS 1754 79.78 85.75 0.00 0.00 
Proprietary 3711 73.35 76.99 
IPO experience 
All PC 5465 70.433 15   
OSS 1754 88.34 16 0.00 0.00 
Proprietary 3711 61.97 14 
Capital under management (Log) 
All PC 5465 9.783    
OSS 1754 10.52  0.00  
Proprietary 3711 9.43   
Connectedness (%) 
All PC 5465 0. 53 0.15   
OSS 1754 0. 61 0.17 0.00 0.00 
Proprietary 3711 0.49 0.14 
Number of funding rounds 
All PC 6555 6.10 6   
OSS 2029 6.68 6 0.00 0.00 
Proprietary 4526 5.83 5 
Syndication size 
All PC 6,555 4.84 4   
OSS 2029 4.72 4 0.04 0.83 
Proprietary 4,526 4.89 4 
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Table 3- Pair wise Correlation Matrix 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
(1) 1.00 
                        
(2) -0.13 1.00 
                       
(3) 0.84 -0.11 1.00 
                      
(4) 0.42 0.08 0.39 1.00 
                     
(5) 0.55 -0.05 0.57 0.29 1.00 
                    
(6) 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.10 -0.02 1.00 
                   
(7) -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.03 1.00 
                  
(8) 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.12 -0.02 1.00 
                 
(9) 0.14 -0.02 0.15 0.16 0.00 -0.12 -0.25 -0.01 1.00 
                
(10) 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.12 -0.21 0.02 -0.13 -0.03 0.14 1.00 
               
(11) -0.10 0.15 -0.12 -0.13 0.14 -0.01 0.11 0.04 -0.13 -0.63 1.00 
              
(12) 0.15 -0.15 0.12 0.03 0.21 0.00 0.08 0.01 -0.05 -0.58 -0.09 1.00 
             
(13) -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 1.00 
            
(14) 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.13 -0.02 0.28 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.00 1.00 
           
(15) 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.12 -0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.05 0.03 -0.05 1.00 
          
(16) -0.04 0.02 -0.05 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.43 1.00 
         
(17) 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.10 -0.03 0.11 -0.06 0.15 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.04 0.03 1.00 
        
(18) -0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.02 -0.05 0.04 -0.20 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.07 0.14 -0.58 1.00 
       
(19) 0.14 -0.01 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.09 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.18 -0.02 -0.08 -0.04 -0.11 1.00 
      
(20) -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 -0.13 0.00 -0.29 -0.23 -0.06 0.12 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.31 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.10 1.00 
     
(21) 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.05 -0.03 0.10 0.06 0.13 -0.08 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.15 0.05 0.11 0.10 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 1.00 
    
(22) 0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.00 -0.12 0.08 0.06 -0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.00 0.10 -0.22 0.05 -0.14 -0.02 1.00 
   
(23) -0.06 -0.11 -0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.09 0.09 -0.27 -0.07 -0.07 0.04 0.06 0.02 -0.10 -0.03 0.16 -0.18 0.27 -0.02 -0.09 0.02 -0.13 1.00 
  
(24) -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 -0.14 0.04 -0.14 0.22 -0.19 -0.04 -0.14 0.11 0.08 -0.01 -0.20 -0.02 0.00 -0.12 0.05 -0.02 0.04 -0.07 0.59 0.21 1.00 
 
(25) 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.16 -0.03 0.16 -0.10 0.25 0.05 0.08 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.32 0.08 -0.03 0.24 -0.27 0.12 -0.16 0.11 0.07 -0.32 -0.31 1.00 
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Table 4- VC quality regression 
 General experience 
(OLS) 
 Industry Specific experience(%) 
(Tobit) 
IPO experience 
(OLS) 
Capital under management(log) 
(OLS) 
Normalized Betweeness Centrality(%) 
(Tobit) 
OSS 72.095 3.637 25.588 0.562 0.180 
 
(41.205)* (1.528)** (10.297)** (0.217)*** (0.063)*** 
Lead investor 171.607 -1.254 42.522 1.529 0.137 
 
(32.937)*** (1.236) (9.135)*** (0.176)*** (0.050)*** 
Private VC 204.906 11.918 53.435 2.727 0.381 
 
(22.716)*** (3.685)*** (5.611)*** (0.408)*** (0.056)*** 
Corporate VC 62.182 24.539 2.916 0.964 0.964 
 
(27.789)** (4.355)*** (5.198) (0.481)** (0.169)*** 
Bank VC 519.479 -1.210 110.967 3.250 1.436 
 
(128.630)*** (4.647) (15.156)*** (0.537)*** (0.208)*** 
Individual VC -64.960 4.338 -20.498 0.055 -0.023 
 (41.227) (9.400) (11.012)* (0.950) (0.121) 
Early stage 15.305 3.572 -3.550 0.282 -0.079 
 
(32.050) (1.569)** (8.553) (0.233) (0.067) 
California 46.530 4.707 21.347 0.777 0.135 
 
(36.507) (1.619)*** (9.254)** (0.200)*** (0.060)** 
Massachussets -27.580 3.717 -5.643 0.661 0.161 
 (43.251) (1.921)* (10.430) (0.272)** (0.080)** 
Soft publishing 22.856 1.404 -4.564 0.473 -0.008 
 
(39.635) (1.621) (10.203) (0.211)** (0.063) 
Soft reproduction -16.918 2.841 -4.100 0.316 0.001 
 
(34.533) (1.905) (9.831) (0.245) (0.070) 
Patents 12.416 -0.021 2.341 0.042 0.011 
 
(3.889)*** (0.122) (0.797)*** (0.015)*** (0.005)** 
First investment -36.409 -2.766 -9.340 -1.101 -0.069 
 
(19.025)* (1.255)** (5.232)* (0.186)*** (0.049) 
Company age -6.369 -0.060 -1.830 0.055 0.005 
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 (4.930) (0.176) (1.181) (0.033)* (0.008) 
VC market size 39.525 7.862 -3.099 1.413 -0.316 
 
(34.189) (1.937)*** (9.213) (0.305)*** (0.079)*** 
S & P index 47.483 -10.225 22.559 0.362 0.203 
 
(87.719) (3.712)*** (23.554) (0.497) (0.161) 
Bubble -79.652 -3.390 -1.386 -1.547 0.166 
 
(35.201)** (1.728)** (8.734) (0.269)*** (0.073)** 
Fin crisis 136.267 -0.418 7.676 0.384 0.032 
 (44.778)*** (1.413) (9.131) (0.197)* (0.053) 
Constant -399.397 -19.146 26.463 -8.573  
 
(340.779) (19.637) (91.707) (3.025)***  
sigma  24.910   1.249 
  (0.681)***   (0.067)*** 
R2 0.11  0.08 0.12  
N 5,465 5,465 5,465 5,462 5,465 
Note. In all models clustered Robust Std. Err. Is Reported in parentheses, *, ** or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively 
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Table 5. VC Governance Poisson regression 
 rounds  
1 
rounds  
2 
syndication size  
3 
syndication size  
4 
OSS 0.248 0.243 -0.020 0.001 
 
(0.072)*** (0.077)*** (0.072) (0.066) 
Lead investor -0.389 -0.359 -0.301 -0.312 
 
(0.046)*** (0.050)*** (0.030)*** (0.033)*** 
Private VC 0.109 0.130 0.176 0.014 
 
(0.052)** (0.102) (0.056)*** (0.054) 
Corporate VC -0.041 0.052 0.305 0.109 
 
(0.100) (0.136) (0.051)*** (0.073) 
Bank VC -0.017 -0.032 0.275 0.121 
 
(0.113) (0.153) (0.058)*** (0.068)* 
Individual VC -0.062 0.280 0.178 0.091 
 (0.074) (0.233) (0.081)** (0.194) 
Early stage 0.025 0.108 0.102 0.081 
 
(0.078) (0.082) (0.066) (0.066) 
California 0.075 0.066 0.033 0.051 
 
(0.070) (0.072) (0.076) (0.069) 
Massachussets 0.244 0.208 -0.017 -0.003 
 (0.091)*** (0.092)** (0.085) (0.076) 
Soft publishing 0.176 0.181 -0.031 -0.030 
 
(0.077)** (0.081)** (0.082) (0.079) 
Soft reproduction 0.130 0.181 0.015 0.019 
 
(0.085) (0.092)** (0.078) (0.078) 
Patents -0.007 -0.009 0.007 0.007 
 
(0.012) (0.016) (0.003)** (0.003)** 
First investment   -0.458 -0.442 
 
  (0.050)*** (0.046)*** 
Company age -0.050 -0.045 -0.013 -0.012 
 (0.018)*** (0.018)** (0.010) (0.009) 
VC market size 0.028 0.026 0.183 0.174 
 
(0.113) (0.126) (0.093)** (0.093)* 
S & P index 0.356 0.311 -0.009 -0.028 
 
(0.204)* (0.219) (0.134) (0.134) 
Bubble -0.051 -0.039 0.144 0.163 
 
(0.103) (0.108) (0.081)* (0.083)** 
Fin crisis -0.100 -0.100 -0.089 -0.124 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.096) (0.070)* 
IPO exprience  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)   
Constant 0.990 0.905 -0.387 -0.145 
 (1.127) (1.281) (0.892) (0.918) 
N 1,177 898 6,555 5,465 
Note. In all models clustered Robust Std. Err. Is Reported in parentheses, * ,** or ***  indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% 
level, respectively.
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Appendices: 
Appendix 1: two examples of OSS product announcements extracted from PROMT  
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Appendix 2-Robustness Check by differentiating between OSS entrepreneurial ventures which their business model is entirely based on OSS (OSS1) and 
entrepreneurial venture we found only one OSS release (OSS2) 
 
Industry Specific experience(%) General experience IPO experience Capital under management(log) Normalized Betweeness Centrality(%) rounds  syndication size  
OSS1 3.024 108.314 30.336 0.888 0.222 0.321 -0.097 
 
(1.589)* (59.251)* (15.317)** (0.269)*** (0.077)*** (0.089)*** (0.103) 
OSS2 4.212 36.155 20.876 0.239 0.093 0.185 0.131 
 
(1.695)** (45.893) (12.132)* (0.278) (0.077) (0.094)** (0.076)* 
Lead investor -0.668 171.077 42.452 1.524 0.094 -0.393 -0.291 
 
(1.109) (32.745)*** (9.101)*** (0.175)*** (0.047)** (0.046)*** (0.025)*** 
Private VC 11.995 201.065 52.932 2.692 0.243 0.107 0.039 
 
(3.139)*** (22.206)*** (5.561)*** (0.411)*** (0.028)*** (0.052)** (0.052) 
Corporate VC 21.496 57.510 2.304 0.921 0.899 -0.036 0.116 
 
(3.646)*** (26.976)** (5.122) (0.480)* (0.149)*** (0.100) (0.042)*** 
Bank VC -0.458 519.627 110.986 3.251 1.288 -0.003 0.121 
 
(4.092) (128.666)*** (15.182)*** (0.542)*** (0.190)*** (0.114) (0.054)** 
Individual VC 6.872 -77.392 -22.128 -0.058 -0.114 -0.060 -0.037 
 (8.482) (44.321)* (11.636)* (0.938) (0.059)* (0.074) (0.071) 
Patents -0.026 12.614 2.367 0.044 0.011 -0.007 0.009 
 
(0.104) (3.963)*** (0.803)*** (0.016)*** (0.005)** (0.012) (0.002)*** 
Early stage 3.071 16.622 -3.377 0.294 -0.083 0.020 0.138 
 
(1.402)** (32.443) (8.614) (0.235) (0.063) (0.078) (0.082)* 
California 4.797 39.027 20.363 0.710 0.098 0.064 0.108 
 
(1.427)*** (37.878) (9.712)** (0.204)*** (0.057)* (0.070) (0.079) 
Massachussets 4.207 -30.131 -5.978 0.638 0.126 0.241 -0.133 
 (1.686)** (43.358) (10.510) (0.269)** (0.074)* (0.089)*** (0.088) 
Soft publishing 1.392 20.836 -4.829 0.455 -0.039 0.179 -0.008 
 
(1.412) (39.684) (10.149) (0.213)** (0.059) (0.078)** (0.090) 
Soft reproduction 2.646 -19.849 -4.484 0.289 -0.025 0.131 0.010 
 
(1.648) (34.097) (9.699) (0.243) (0.065) (0.086) (0.098) 
First investment -2.668 -38.314 -9.590 -1.118 0.004  -0.264 
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(1.073)** (18.991)** (5.223)* (0.185)*** (0.043)  (0.032)*** 
Company age -0.054 -5.889 -1.767 0.059 0.003 -0.049 0.003 
 (0.164) (5.008) (1.198) (0.033)* (0.008) (0.018)*** (0.009) 
VC market size 8.219 33.480 -3.891 1.358 -0.362 0.005 0.120 
 
(1.678)*** (34.630) (9.285) (0.303)*** (0.071)*** (0.116) (0.085) 
S & P index -8.730 49.947 22.882 0.384 0.167 0.352 0.390 
 
(3.218)*** (88.102) (23.590) (0.494) (0.150) (0.203)* (0.124)*** 
Bubble -3.679 -73.662 -0.601 -1.493 0.234 -0.022 0.018 
 
(1.516)** (35.792)** (8.775) (0.268)*** (0.064)*** (0.108) (0.059) 
Fin crisis 0.539 120.955 5.669 0.246 -0.012 -0.127 -0.097 
 
(1.331) (45.285)*** (9.275) (0.205) (0.050) (0.109) (0.101) 
Constant -24.412 -331.681 35.341 -7.963 3.651 1.221 0.831 
 
(17.034) (344.689) (92.285) (3.005)*** (0.707)*** (1.151) (0.794) 
R2 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.09   
N 5,465 5,465 5,465 5,462 5,465 1,177 6,555 
 
Note. In all models clustered Robust Std. Err. Is Reported in parentheses, *, ** or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Appendix 3- Robustness Check by differentiating between investment dyads belonging to OSS entrepreneurial ventures with patent (OSS with patent) and with no patent 
(OSS no patent) 
 General experience Industry Specific experience (%) IPO experience Capital under management (log) Normalized Betweeness Centrality(%) rounds  syndication size  
OSS  no patent 69.818 4.270 22.945 0.466 0.182 0.224 -0.142 
 
(44.621) (1.484)*** (11.649)** (0.249)* (0.080)** (0.074)*** (0.070)** 
OSS with patent 74.774 2.892 28.698 0.676 0.178 0.418 0.103 
 (53.667) (2.201) (13.186)** (0.264)** (0.081)** (0.160)*** (0.089) 
Lead investor 171.703 -1.282 42.633 1.533 0.137 -0.390 -0.298 
 
(33.146)*** (1.233) (9.188)*** (0.176)*** (0.050)*** (0.046)*** (0.029)*** 
Private VC 204.936 11.912 53.470 2.729 0.381 0.101 0.171 
 
(22.744)*** (3.687)*** (5.617)*** (0.408)*** (0.056)*** (0.052)* (0.056)*** 
Corporate VC 62.248 24.525 2.994 0.967 0.964 -0.041 0.300 
 
(27.730)** (4.356)*** (5.196) (0.481)** (0.169)*** (0.100) (0.052)*** 
Bank VC 519.321 -1.162 110.784 3.244 1.436 -0.044 0.261 
 
(129.082)*** (4.647) (15.208)*** (0.535)*** (0.209)*** (0.105) (0.058)*** 
Individual VC -65.200 4.411 -20.776 0.045 -0.023 -0.069 0.172 
 (41.363) (9.435) (11.142)* (0.943) (0.121) (0.074) (0.081)** 
Patents 12.378 -0.011 2.297 0.041 0.011 -0.010 0.005 
 
(3.913)*** (0.125) (0.796)*** (0.015)*** (0.005)** (0.016) (0.003)* 
Early stage 15.085 3.632 -3.805 0.273 -0.078 0.027 0.090 
 
(31.695) (1.564)** (8.460) (0.234) (0.066) (0.077) (0.064) 
California 46.508 4.713 21.321 0.776 0.135 0.076 0.033 
 
(36.521) (1.620)*** (9.263)** (0.200)*** (0.061)** (0.069) (0.075) 
Massachussets -27.661 3.741 -5.737 0.657 0.161 0.239 -0.020 
 (43.216) (1.921)* (10.415) (0.272)** (0.080)** (0.089)*** (0.085) 
Soft publishing 23.001 1.365 -4.395 0.480 -0.008 0.175 -0.023 
 
(39.689) (1.605) (10.261) (0.212)** (0.064) (0.077)** (0.079) 
Soft reproduction -16.845 2.822 -4.015 0.319 0.001 0.129 0.018 
 
(34.650) (1.897) (9.897) (0.245) (0.070) (0.085) (0.076) 
First investment -36.143 -2.840 -9.031 -1.090 -0.069  -0.445 
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(18.943)* (1.248)** (5.200)* (0.187)*** (0.049)  (0.050)*** 
Company age -6.441 -0.039 -1.913 0.052 0.005 -0.049 -0.017 
 (5.036) (0.179) (1.223) (0.034) (0.008) (0.018)*** (0.010)* 
VC market size 39.705 7.811 -2.890 1.420 -0.316 0.030 0.187 
 
(34.515) (1.942)*** (9.277) (0.306)*** (0.079)*** (0.112) (0.092)** 
S & P index 47.338 -10.188 22.391 0.356 0.203 0.358 -0.017 
 
(87.920) (3.712)*** (23.642) (0.498) (0.161) (0.204)* (0.131) 
Bubble -79.645 -3.392 -1.377 -1.547 0.166 -0.052 0.148 
 
(35.217)** (1.733)* (8.763) (0.269)*** (0.073)** (0.103) (0.079)* 
Fin crisis 136.443 -0.469 7.881 0.391 0.032 -0.101 -0.079 
 (44.323)*** (1.402) (9.011) (0.197)** (0.053) (0.108) (0.094) 
Sigma  24.906   1.249   
 
 (0.682)***   (0.067)***   
_cons -400.846 -18.735 24.781 -8.635 2.920 0.979 -0.397 
 
(343.445) (19.632) (92.218) (3.032)*** (0.794)*** (1.114) (0.886) 
R2 0.11  0.08 0.12    
N 5,465 5,465 5,465 5,462 5,465 1,177 6,555 
Note. In all models clustered Robust Std. Err. Is Reported in parentheses, * ,** or ***  indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively 
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Appendix 4 - univariate analysis after propensity score matching 
Outcome Expected sign OSS Proprietary Differences Std. Error t-stat 
General experience + 414.31 360.87 53.437*** 26.05 2.05 
Industry specific experience + 79.80 75.28 4.51***    1.00 4.50 
IPO experience + 88.39 71.38 17.01***      5.94 2.86 
Capital under management + 10.52 9.62 0.90**    .19 4.72 
Connectedness + 0.61 .51 0.10* 0.05 1.73 
# Rounds + 6.74    5.91 0.82***     0.13 6.32 
Syndication size I 4.71 4.21 0.51***      .12 4.30 
Note. *, ** or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively 
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Appendix 5 –regression of VC quality and governance after Propensity Score matching  
 General 
experience 
 Industry Specific 
experience(%) 
IPO 
experience 
Capital under management 
(log) 
Normalized Betweeness 
Centrality(%) 
rounds  syndication 
size  
OSS 72.375 3.637 25.659 0.562 0.181 0.249 0.003 
 (41.213)* (1.528)** (10.305)** (0.217)*** (0.063)*** (0.076)*** (0.066) 
Lead investor 171.528 -1.256 42.506 1.529 0.136 -0.355 -0.311 
 
(32.929)*** (1.235) (9.133)*** (0.176)*** (0.050)*** (0.050)*** (0.033)*** 
Private VC 206.055 12.288 53.503 2.727 0.375 0.139 0.012 
 
(22.752)*** (3.728)*** (5.626)*** (0.408)*** (0.054)*** (0.102) (0.054) 
Corporate VC 63.285 24.906 2.976 0.964 0.957 0.055 0.105 
 
(27.856)** (4.391)*** (5.213) (0.481)** (0.169)*** (0.136) (0.073) 
Bank VC 522.002 -0.792 111.352 3.250 1.434 -0.008 0.122 
 
(128.997)*** (4.686) (15.184)*** (0.537)*** (0.208)*** (0.148) (0.069)* 
Individual VC -63.936 4.701 -20.453 0.055 -0.030 0.273 0.087 
 (41.278) (9.422) (11.031)* (0.950) (0.120) (0.232) (0.194) 
Patents 12.423 -0.019 2.341 0.042 0.011 -0.008 0.007 
 
(3.888)*** (0.123) (0.797)*** (0.015)*** (0.005)** (0.016) (0.003)** 
Early stage 15.548 3.619 -3.519 0.282 -0.079 0.106 0.081 
 
(32.080) (1.569)** (8.558) (0.233) (0.067) (0.082) (0.066) 
California 46.815 4.734 21.402 0.777 0.136 0.070 0.052 
 
(36.502) (1.619)*** (9.257)** (0.200)*** (0.060)** (0.072) (0.069) 
Massachussets -27.496 3.764 -5.660 0.661 0.162 0.206 -0.004 
 (43.273) (1.930)* (10.436) (0.272)** (0.080)** (0.093)** (0.076) 
Soft publishing 23.171 1.437 -4.504 0.473 -0.008 0.179 -0.030 
 
(39.671) (1.621) (10.208) (0.211)** (0.063) (0.081)** (0.079) 
Soft 
reproduction 
-16.740 2.907 -4.100 0.316 0.000 0.176 0.018 
 
(34.550) (1.907) (9.835) (0.245) (0.070) (0.092)* (0.077) 
First investment -36.336 -2.738 -9.340 -1.101 -0.069 0.000 -0.443 
 
(19.030)* (1.254)** (5.233)* (0.186)*** (0.049) (0.000) (0.046)*** 
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Company age -6.367 -0.063 -1.827 0.055 0.005 -0.045 -0.012 
 (4.933) (0.176) (1.182) (0.033)* (0.008) (0.018)** (0.009) 
VC market size 39.997 7.978 -3.064 1.413 -0.315 0.026 0.171 
 
(34.243) (1.941)*** (9.227) (0.305)*** (0.079)*** (0.126) (0.093)* 
S & P index 47.908 -10.204 22.640 0.362 0.207 0.314 -0.029 
 
(87.788) (3.717)*** (23.569) (0.497) (0.161) (0.218) (0.133) 
Bubble -80.320 -3.522 -1.462 -1.547 0.165 -0.043 0.165 
 
(35.262)** (1.727)** (8.749) (0.269)*** (0.073)** (0.107) (0.083)** 
Fin crisis 135.830 -0.452 7.592 0.384 0.030 -0.105 -0.123 
 (44.740)*** (1.414) (9.134) (0.197)* (0.053) (0.107) (0.070)* 
Constant -405.731 -20.737 25.970 -8.573 2.917 0.917 -0.118 
 
(341.488) (19.716) (91.889) (3.025)*** (0.790)*** (1.281) (0.917) 
Sigma  24.896   1.249   
 
 (0.681)***   (0.067)***   
R2 0.11  0.08 0.12    
N 5,462 5,462 5,462 5,462 5,462 898 5,462 
Note. In all models clustered Robust Std. Err. Is Reported in parentheses, *, ** or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively 
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Appendix 6 – Endogeneity check by using instrumental variables (IV) and Heckman treatment (CF) model (Dependent 
Variable: VC’s general experience) 
 Probit selection IV CF 
OSS   470.484 
 
  (98.456)*** 
OSS predicted  457.826  
 
 (96.589)***  
PhD intensity 1.281   
 
(0.162)***   
Hacker intensity 0.031   
 
(0.004)***   
Lead investor -0.046 181.134 181.643 
 
(0.043) (15.259)*** (15.204)*** 
Private VC -0.018 214.835 214.240 
 
(0.117) (12.701)*** (40.293)*** 
Corporate VC 0.323 30.832 29.850 
 
(0.130)** (20.634) (47.675) 
Bank VC 0.265 355.565 353.920 
 
(0.133)** (40.206)*** (48.135)*** 
Individual VC 0.330 -77.987 -79.041 
 
(0.358) (28.680)*** (129.761) 
Early stage 0.392 -37.717 -38.575 
 
(0.050)*** (18.981)** (21.128)* 
Soft publishing 0.023 5.844 4.764 
 
(0.048) (17.789) (17.151) 
Soft reproduction -0.407 16.464 15.323 
 
(0.054)*** (20.103) (20.644) 
Patents -0.006 11.103 11.244 
 
(0.004)* (1.768)*** (1.230)*** 
First investment -0.218 -29.094 -25.792 
 
(0.058)*** (18.351) (20.329) 
Company age -0.003 -3.187 -3.055 
 
(0.007) (2.345) (2.548) 
VC market size -0.149 -10.474 -10.949 
 
(0.054)*** (3.378)*** (4.931)** 
S & P index -1.599 198.267 209.691 
 
(0.112)*** (54.777)*** (63.444)*** 
Fin crisis 0.440 65.718 64.015 
 
(0.050)*** (27.494)** (25.678)** 
_cons -0.817  -0.817 
 
(0.620)  (0.633) 
lambda   -220.293 
 
  (59.004)*** 
N 5,336 5,336 5,336 
R2  0.37  
Note. In all models clustered Robust Std. Err. Is Reported in parentheses, *, ** or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% 
level, respectively 
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Appendix 7: Formal description of instrumental variable and Heckman treatment model 
In robustness section we used a method to solve for possible endogeneity problem.  In this part we try 
to explain formally how the model works:  
We investigate the VC quality (yij) that entrepreneurial ventures received depending on whether the 
firm adopted an OSS business model or relied on proprietary model (OSSj) .  
yij= ȕj’ OSSj+ ȕij’ xj+İij    (1) 
where ȕij’and ȕj’are unknown parameters and İij is zero mean error terms . 
In this paper following (Vella and Verbek, 1999) we consider OSSj as treatment variable. This will 
allow us to estimate equation (1) via instrumental variables and control function approach (CF). In the 
both cases we estimate selection equation as following:  
OSSj=Ȗ’zi+ui ,        (2) 
Where zi is a set of variables of whether an entrepreneurial venture choose OSS business model or not.  
It is enough to include an instrument with nonzero coefficient in the equation (3) and identify the 
experimental treatment average (Vella and Verbek, 1999). ui is independent of zi and normally 
distributed.  
This procedure will allow us to solve endogeneity problem which implies if we estimate equation 1 
without correcting for endogeneity İij and ui can be correlated and lead to biased estimate of ȕ in 
equation (1). 
In the first approach from equation (2) we estimate predicted probabilities of OSSj
 
in a Probit model 
and insert Eq. (1). The predicted value of OSSj
 
is correlated with yij but not with İij  . Hence we can 
estimate (1) by OLS. ݕ௜௝ ൌ  ߚ݆ ܱܵ ఫܵ෣ ൅ ߚ݆݅ ݔ݆ ൅ ߝ݆݅    (3) 
In the second approach we use control function method (Heckman, 1978, 1979), which can be shown 
formally as following: let us consider the conditional expectation of yij given on OSSj and zi is:   ሺݕ݆݅ȁ     ǡ   ሻ ൌ  ߚ݆’ ܱ݆ܵܵ ൅  ߚ݆݅’ ݔ݆ ൅ ܧሺߟ݅ȁ     ǡ   ሻ        (4) 
Where we have:  
   ܧሺߟ݅ȁ     ǡ   ሻ ൌ  ܱ݆ܵܵ ܧሺߝ݆݅ ȁ    ൌ ͳ ǡ   ሻ ൅ ሺͳ െ     ሻ ܧሺߝ݆݅ ȁ    ൌ Ͳ ǡ   ሻ   (4) 
Under the joint normality assumption, the two conditional expectations on the right side can be written 
as: 
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ܧሺߝ݆݅ ȁ ܱ݆ܵܵǡ ݖ݅ሻ ൌ ߪ݆ߝߣ݅ሺݖ݅ߨሻ   (5) 
Where  
Ȝ୧ሺ ୧ʌሻ ൌ ܱܵ ௝ܵ థሺି୸౟ʌሻଵିɎሺି୸౟ʌሻ ൅ ሺͳ െ ܱܵ ௝ܵሻ ିథሺ୸౟ʌሻɎሺି୸౟ʌሻ                (6) 
Ȝi(ziʌ) Is generalized residual of the Probit model (see Gourieroux et al, 1987) which describes the 
treatment decision, where ࢥ (.) represents the probability density function and ɎሺǤ ሻ
 
is cumulative 
density function. Ȝi(ziʌ) will be estimated from equation (6). In the next step we have two options. 
First we interact estimated Ȝi(ziʌ) (ߣሻ෢ and OSSj  and estimate equation 1. Alternatively we can add (ߣሻ෢ 
as a single regressor in equation (1). the second option require an additional assumption that standard 
deviation of treated and none treated are equal.
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Appendix 8a (Graph at right) and 8b (Graph at left): The VC quality in the OSS and proprietary regime 
 
 
 
Appendix 8C: Actual and Hypothetical VC quality in the OSS and proprietary regime (dependent variable Capital under 
management) 
 Actual VC quality for OSS entrepreneurial ventures Hypothetical VC quality for OSS entrepreneurial ventures difference 
Mean 9.89 8.56 1.33*** 
 Actual VC quality for proprietary entrepreneurial ventures Hypothetical VC quality for Proprietary entrepreneurial ventures difference 
Mean 9.12 20.71 -11.58*** 
Note. *, ** or *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively 
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Appendix 9:  Formal description of “Switching Regression” model 
We investigate the VC quality (yij) that an entrepreneurial venture received depending on whether the 
firm adopted an OSS business model or relied on proprietary model (OSSj).  
yij= ȕj’ OSSj+ įij’ xj+İij    (1) 
Where ȕij’and ȕj’are unknown parameters and İij is zero mean error terms. 
In this paper following (Bertschek and Kaiser, 2004) we consider two regimes of OSS and proprietary. 
The VC quality in OSS regime is:  
yi1= įi1 xj+İi1   if OSSj=1     (2) 
And in proprietary regime is:  
yi0= įi0 xj+İi0    if OSSj=0   (3) 
Where 1 and 0 refer to where entrepreneurial ventures are OSS or proprietary.  
Firm decide to choose OSS model if the cost involved (Ci) is smaller than gain (here VC quality) thus 
latent variable is: ܫ௜כ ൌ ܽሺݕ݅ͳ െ  ݕ݅Ͳሻ െ ܥ݅ ൅ ݑ݅     (3) 
It represents the difference in quality of VC and cost arising from adopting OSS business model, 
where ui is an i.i.d normally distributed optimization error. Therefore the selection mechanism for 
observing OSS business model is:  
    ൌ ൜ͳ   ݂݅ ܫ௜כ ൐ Ͳ Ͳǡ ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁   (4) 
By substituting Eq. 1 and 2 in Eq. 3 we have: ܫ௜כ ൌ ܽݔ݆൫ߜ݅ͳ Ȃ  ߜ݅Ͳ൯ െ ܥ݅ ൅ ݒ݅ ൌ ܼ݅ߨ ൅ ݒ݅     (5) 
Where ݒ݅ ൌ ܽሺߝ݅ͳ െ ߝ݅ʹሻ ൅ ݑ݅ , has a normal distribution on with N (0,ı2ossj ).This implies we can 
jointly estimate Eq. 1, 2 and 5 using a full information maximum likelihood estimator. Practically we 
are able to estimate whether entrepreneurial venture is in OSS or proprietary regime using a Probit 
model and the likelihood function can be shown as following (Zax, 1999; Maddala 1983): 
ܮ ൌ σ ቆܱ݆ܵܵ ቊ   ሺɎሺ߰ͳ݅ሻ ൅    ሺథቀഄభ഑భቁఙଵ ሻቋ ൅ ሺͳ െ ܱ݆ܵܵሻ ቊ   ሺͳ െ Ɏሺ߰Ͳ݅ሻ ൅    ሺథቀഄబ഑బቁఙ଴ ሻቋቇ௜         (6)  
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Where Ɏ (.) is cumulative normal distribution function and ࢥ(.) is a normal density distribution 
function. 
݆߰݅ ൌ ሺ௓௜గାഐೕഄೕ഑ೕ ሻටଵିఘೕమ    
ߩଵ ൌ ఙభೡమఙభఙೡ is correlation between İi1 and ݒ݅ , and similarly we can estimate ߩ଴ . After calculating the 
parameters we can calculate conditional expectations (Lokshin 
And Sajaia, 2004):  
 ܧሺݕ݅ͳȁ    ൌ ͳǡ ݔ݆ሻ ൌ  ߜ݅ͳ ݔ݆ ൅ ߪଵߩଵ థሺ௭೔గሻɎሺ௭೔గሻ          (7) ܧሺݕ݅ͳȁ    ൌ Ͳǡ ݔ݆ሻ ൌ  ߜ݅ͳ ݔ݆ ൅ ߪଵߩଵ థሺ௭೔గሻଵିɎሺ௭೔గሻ      (8) ܧሺݕ݅Ͳȁ    ൌ ͳǡ ݔ݆ሻ ൌ  ߜ݅Ͳ ݔ݆ ൅ ߪ଴Ͳథሺ௭೔గሻɎሺ௭೔గሻ          (9) ܧሺݕ݅Ͳȁ    ൌ Ͳǡ ݔ݆ሻ ൌ  ߜ݅Ͳ ݔ݆ ൅ ߪ଴ߩ଴ థሺ௭೔గሻଵିɎሺ௭೔గሻ    (10) 
 
 
